Stop rogue DHCP at the access edge
- Certification
- CCNA
- Format
- Artifact workspace
- Difficulty
- medium
- Estimated time
- 14 min
- Automated checks
- 9
SCENARIO
ACCESS-4 serves staff devices in VLAN 20 and warehouse scanners in VLAN 30. The legitimate DHCP server is reached through the Gi1/0/48 distribution uplink. A device connected to a client port has started sending rogue DHCP offers, and the same access segment has produced forged ARP replies. The switching topology is otherwise healthy.
TASK
Repair access-switch.cfg to reject rogue DHCP offers and forged ARP replies in VLANs 20 and 30.
- Trust only
Gi1/0/48for DHCP and ARP inspection, and limit DHCP messages on both client ports to 15 per second. - Preserve the supplied hostname, VLANs, client ports, and distribution trunk.